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I. INTRODUCTION
On July 12, 2002, the headline of the Wall Street Journal (hereinafter WSJ) read
“IRS Releases Names of People in Disputed KPMG Tax Shelters.”2 The article

1

Beckett G. Cantley (University of California, Berkeley, B.A., 1989; Southwestern
University School of Law, J.D., cum laude, 1995; and University of Florida, College of Law,
LL.M. in taxation, 1997) is a Professor of Law at St. Thomas University School of Law.
2

Glenn R. Simpson & John D. McKinnon, IRS Names People Who Used Disputed KPMG
Tax Shelters, WALL ST. J., July 12, 2002, at A1.

1
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contained the names of several prominent taxpayers, including the current
Republican nominee for Governor of California,3 a deceased champion stock car
racer,4 a deceased former Secretary of the Treasury,5 and the CEOs of several public
companies.6 The article had culled the names of the taxpayers from a public filing of
a lawsuit instigated by the Internal Revenue Service (hereinafter IRS) against KPMG
LLP (hereinafter KPMG), a “Big Four” accounting firm.7 The lawsuit8 between the
IRS and KPMG was a summons enforcement action in which the IRS was requesting
KPMG to turn over certain taxpayer documents relating to alleged tax shelters
promoted by KPMG9 and entered into by the named taxpayers. KPMG had
previously invoked attorney-client and section 7525 privileges10 on behalf of the
taxpayers in an attempt to prevent the release of the taxpayer documents to the IRS.11
As part of the invocation of privilege, KPMG had to provide the IRS with a privilege
log that set forth the names of the taxpayers relating to the alleged privileged
documents.12 Historically, the names of taxpayers in such a privilege log would not

3
Id. (listing William E Simon, Jr., Republican nominee for Governor of California as one
of the clients of KPMG’s disputed tax shelters).
4

Id. (naming Dale Earnhardt, deceased former world champion stock car driver, as a client
of KPMG).
5

Id. (releasing the name of William E. Simon, Sr., former Secretary of the Treasury, as
having relationships with the alleged KPMG tax Shelters).
6
Id. Henry Nicholas III, CEO of Broadcom Corp., Robert K. Shaye, Chairman of New
Line Cinema, and Richard J. Heckermann, former Chairman of U.S. Filter Corp., were all
named in the Wall Street Journal article.
7

The current “Big Four” accounting firms include KPMG, Deloitte & Touche,
PricewaterhouseCoopers and Ernst & Young.
8
United States of America v. KPMG LLP, Petition to Enforce Internal Revenue Service
Summonses, No. 1:02MS00295 (D.D.C. filed July 9, 2002) [hereinafter Petition].
9

Id. Taxpayer information was being sought for several different alleged tax shelters,
including alleged tax shelters named the Foreign Leveraged Investment Program [hereinafter
FLIP] and the Offshore Portfolio Investment Strategy [hereinafter OPIS].
10

I.R.C. § 7525(a)(1) (2002) provides that:
With respect to tax advice, the same common law protections of confidentiality which
apply to a communication between a taxpayer and an attorney shall also apply to a
communication between a taxpayer and any federally authorized tax practitioner to the
extent the communication would be considered a privileged communication if it were
between a taxpayer and an attorney.
Id.
11

See generally, Justice Department, Privilege Log for January 28, 2002 Summons to
KPMG LLP, reprinted in KPMG Privilege Log Released by Justice Department, 2002 TAX
NOTES TODAY 140-83 (July 10, 2002).
12
For example, one of the summons issued by the IRS required KPMG to provide all
information pertaining to three of KPMG’s tax shelter transactions. These transactions
referred to as BLIP, BLIPS, TRAC, TRACT and IDV by KPMG’s record provided in
pertinent part:
If a privilege is being claimed with respect to any requested document or information,
state with specificity the nature of the privilege and the extent of all allegedly
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be released by the IRS, even in a summons enforcement action.13 The publication of
names caused a large backlash among certain commentators14 and Freedom of
privileged matters. If you object to producing only part of a document, provide us
with a redacted copy and retain the original for review by a court (the part to which
you object and produce the remainder). With respect to each allegedly privileged
document, or portion of a document, provide the following:
1.
The date appearing on such document or, if has no date, the date or
approximate date that such document was created;
2.
The identity or descriptive code number, file number, title, or label of such
document used by the custodian of the document to identify it for retrieval;
3.
The general nature and description of such document and the identity of the
person who signed such document and, if it was not signed, the response
shall so state and give the identity of the person(s) who prepared it;
4.
The identity of the person to whom such document was addressed and the
identity of each person other than such addressee to whom such document,
or a copy thereof were given or sent at any time;
5.
The identity, if known, of the person having or who may have present
possession, custody, or control of such document or a copy thereof; and
6.
Whether or not any draft, copy, or reproduction of such document contains
any postscripts, notation, change, or addendum not appearing on the
document itself and, if so, the response shall give the description of each
such draft, copy or reproduction.”
Petition, supra note 8.
13
The fact that taxpayer names are historically redacted from such public documents was
underscored by the IRS Chief Counsel in a letter to the editors of the Wall Street Journal when
he stated:
We take seriously our public responsibilities to preserve confidences, including,
wherever possible, the names of innocent third parties. It is for this reason that
documents revealing the identity of third parties is unnecessary to the conduct of
litigation are often redacted or filed under seal to protect their privacy.
See Internal Revenue Service & Justice Department, IRS and Justice Letter on KPMG
Privilege Log Disclosure, 2002 TAX NOTES TODAY 145-71 (July 19, 2002).
14

For example, the Wall Street Journal wrote a scathing editorial article entitled “The IRS
Out of Control” that stated in pertinent part:
We knew the Internal Revenue Service’s tax-collection arsenal included, among other
things, the legal right to audit, sue and penalize tax cheats. But until last week we
didn’t know the agency had license to gratuitously humiliate innocent taxpayers in the
process.
On Friday, the Journal reported on page one that the IRS has disclosed the
names of hundreds of citizens engaged in what amounts to tax planning. These
individuals – many of them prominent businessmen – are accused of no wrongdoing.
Their only sin is that they are clients of KPMG, the accounting firm currently doing
battle in court with the IRS.
Last week the Justice Department sued KPMG on behalf of the IRS. The
government alleged that some of KPMG’s tax shelters are illegal and requested the
names of clients who had inquired about them. The accounting firm complied,
providing the names in a so-called “privilege log” to protect their identities. The IRS
promptly whent public with the names, blithely smearing the reputations of innocent
third-party individuals in an effort to strong-arm its court opponent and embarrass its
clients.
This is a dangerous and outrageous precedent. To begin with, not all tax shelters
are illegal, and a court has to rule on the ones in question. Nor is it against the law to
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Information Act requests were sent to the U.S. Treasury Department,15 the IRS16 and
the U.S. Department of Justice (hereinafter DOJ)17 seeking to discover internal
government documents as to who made this decision and how it was made.
Section 6103 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (hereinafter the Code)
provides that certain taxpayer information is confidential as between the IRS and the
taxpayer, subject to certain exceptions.18 Section 7431 of the Code provides redress
for taxpayers in which such confidential taxpayer information is improperly
released.19 What follows is a discussion of whether the disclosure activities of the
minimize one’s tax burden. In fact it’s common sense, and private citizens shouldn’t
be smeared in government press releases or news leaks for trying. …
Not long ago, Congress was curtailing IRS abuses. Perhaps post-Enron, the tax
man feels as if he can once again get away with anything, even harassing honest
Americans. The agency falls under the purview of Treasury Secretary Paul O’Neill
and clearly needs adult supervision. He might start by firing or sending to Siberia
whoever was responsible for this abuse of government power.”
The IRS Out of Control, WALL ST. J., July 17, 2002, at A16 (emphasis added).
15

Tax Analysts sent a Freedom of Information Act [hereinafter FOIA] request to the U.S
Treasury Department seeking several documents, as described below:
In particular, the FOIA request seeks any materials discussing the decision to attach
privilege logs containing KPMG client names. … Tax Analysts has asked for copies
of any documentation discussing the decision to release to the press the petitions and
some attachments on the day filed, and the court filings in electronic form soon
afterward. The FOIA requests also seek memos or documents relating to the letters to
the editor of the Wall Street Journal that were written by officials in the Treasury, IRS,
and Justice Department, including draft versions of the letters.
William A. Dobrovir, Tax Analysts Files FOIA Request for Treasury’s Shelter Summonses
Enforcement Memos, 2002 TAX NOTES TODAY 153-28 (August 6, 2002).
16

Tax Analysts sent a FOIA request to the IRS seeking several documents, as described
below:
In particular, the FOIA request seeks any materials discussing the decision to attach
privilege logs containing KPMG client names. … Tax Analysts has asked for copies
of any documentation discussing the decision to release to the press the petitions and
some attachments on the day filed, and the court filings in electronic form soon
afterward. The FOIA requests also seek memos or documents relating to the letters to
the editor of the Wall Street Journal that were written by officials in the Treasury, IRS,
and Justice Department, including draft versions of the letters.
Id. at 153-39.
17

Tax Analysts sent a FOIA request to the U.S Justice Department seeking several
documents, as described below:
In particular, the FOIA request seeks any materials discussing the decision to attach
privilege logs containing KPMG client names. … Tax Analysts has asked for copies
of any documentation discussing the decision to release to the press the petitions and
some attachments on the day filed, and the court filings in electronic form soon
afterward. The FOIA requests also seek memos or documents relating to the letters to
the editor of the Wall Street Journal that were written by officials in the Treasury, IRS,
and Justice Department, including draft versions of the letters.
Id. at 153-41.
18

26 U.S.C. § 6103 (2002).

19

I.R.C. § 7431.
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IRS in the KPMG case have violated the provisions of section 6103 of the Code and
whether there is taxpayer redress for such violations under section 7431 of the Code
II. SUMMONS ENFORCEMENT ACTION DISCLOSURE
The IRS has been waging a war with the “Big Five”20 (now “Big Four”)21
accounting firms and certain other promoters22 for years over their alleged marketing
of tax shelters.23 For example, after a long battle, the IRS recently came to a global
agreement with one of the Big Four, PricewaterhouseCoopers (hereinafter PWC) that
will settle tax shelter registration and maintenance issues relating to tax shelters
PWC has marketed.24 On January 28, 2002, the IRS issued its first summons to
KPMG, requesting information related to two alleged tax shelters25 allegedly
promoted by KPMG.26 Several other summonses were later issued for additional
alleged tax shelters allegedly promoted by KPMG.27 In response to the summons,
KPMG put together a privilege log containing a list of documents relating to
participants in the alleged tax shelters as well as providing the IRS with
approximately 84 boxes of documents as well as the sworn testimony of certain
individuals.28 In response to KPMG’s document production and privilege log, the
IRS refuted KPMG’s privilege claim and claimed that KPMG needed to turn over
the remaining documents on the privilege log that had yet to be turned over to the
IRS as well as many other documents.29 On July 9, 2002, the IRS filed suit seeking
20

Prior to the collapse of Arthur Andersen, the “Big Five” accounting firms included
Arthur Andersen, KPMG, Deloitte & Touche, PriceWaterhouseCoopers and Ernst & Young.
21

The current “Big Four” accounting firms include KPMG, Deloitte & Touche,
PriceaterhouseCoopers and Ernst & Young.
22
Another example of an alleged promoter of tax shelters being pursued by the IRS was
the accounting firm of BDO Seidman, LLP, which also was the subject of a summons
enforcement action on the same date that the KPMG summons enforcement action was filed.
See David L. Lupi-Sher, IRS Moves Aggressively Against Accounting Firms Marketing Tax
Shelters, 2002 TAX NOTES TODAY 133-4 (July 10, 2002).
23

Tax Notes Today has reported that all the former Big Five accounting firms have been
served with summonses relating to the alleged promotion of tax shelters. See Sheryl Stratton,
PWC Deal Heads Off Shelter Summons Enforcement, 2002 TAX NOTES TODAY 125-1 (June
27, 2002).
24

Id. On June 27, 2002, the IRS announced that it had reached a deal with
PricewaterhouseCoopers [hereinafter PWC] that will result in PWC paying a “substantial
payment” to the IRS, PWC providing certain client information to the IRS in response to
summonses, and PWC developing processes to ensure ongoing compliance with the tax shelter
registration and investor list maintenance requirements.
25

The two alleged tax shelters were the FLIP and the OPIS strategies. See Petition, supra
note 8.
26

See Lupi-Sher, supra note 22, at 133-34.

27

See Petition, supra note 8.

28

See Lupi-Sher, supra note 22, at 133-34.

29

The IRS claimed that KPMG had failed to produce 1,129 of the 1,162 documents listed
in the privilege log. See Petition, supra note 8.
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to enforce the civil summonses against KPMG.30 As part of its petition to enforce
the civil summonses, the IRS attached the KPMG privilege log that listed the
documents KPMG considered to be privileged.31 However, the IRS failed to redact
the names of the taxpayers whose documents were contained in the privilege log,
even though the taxpayers were not parties to the IRS enforcement action.32 As a
result, the names of the taxpayers became public record and were printed in the WSJ
shortly after the privilege log was made public33 as well as other media outlets.34
On July 19, 2002, the IRS Office of Chief Counsel issued new guidelines for the
review and disclosure of privilege logs or similar documents that identify third
parties in court, including summons enforcement actions.35 The guidelines require
that IRS counsel should closely examine any privilege log or similar document that
will be made public and it should be presumed that the names of third parties who
are not parties to the litigation be redacted from the privilege log before the privilege
log is made public.36 Thus, the guidelines indicate that the IRS has apparently
recognized the error of its ways in the KPMG case.37 The open question is whether
current law allows redress to the taxpayers that were named in the KPMG case prior
to the revised guidelines.

30

Id.

31

Id.

32

Id.

33

Id.

34

Tax Notes Today reported that the more prominent names listed in the privilege log were
disclosed in Forbes Magazine, the New York Times and Bloomberg. See Stratton, supra note
23, at 145-48.
35

See Internal Revenue Service, IRS Releases Requirements for Disclosure of Third-Party
Information in Privilege Logs, 2002 TAX NOTES TODAY 140-6, (July 19, 2002) [hereinafter
IRS Release].
36

Id.

37
This mea culpa was further evidenced by a letter written by the IRS Chief Counsel to the
editors of the Wall Street Journal stating:
We agree with the concerns expressed in your editorial of July 17 that no taxpayer
should be “gratuitously humiliated” in court proceedings. We take seriously our
public responsibilities to preserve confidences, including, wherever possible, the
names of innocent third parties. It is for this reason that documents revealing the
identity of third parties is unnecessary to the conduct of litigation are often redacted or
filed under seal to protect their privacy.
We want to reiterate that the facts that individuals were listed by KPMG on the
privilege log filed in this suit does not necessarily mean that these individuals
participated in tax shelters. Nevertheless, it is clear in hindsight that, while such
disclosure was permissible, it would have been better practice to redact the names
from KPMG’s privilege log before it was filed in federal court or to ask the court’s
permission to file it under seal. The Office of Chief Counsel of the Internal Revenue
Service and the Tax Division of the Department of Justice are working on procedures
that should avoid similar missteps in the future.”
IRS Release, supra note 35, at 145-71.
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III. SECTION 6103
A. General Rule
1. The Law and Public Policy
Section 6103(a) sets forth the general rule that taxpayer “return information” is
generally confidential, subject to certain exceptions.38 Section 6103(b)(2) provides
that “return information” includes taxpayer names as well as other information.39
Additionally, commentators have indicated that the definition of “return
information” has evolved to include virtually all information collected by the IRS
regarding a person’s tax liability.40
Congress was specific in its rationale for enacting section 6103. The
Congressional Record indicates that section 6103 was enacted to protect the
taxpayer’s privacy and to ensure that confidential information obtained by the IRS in
the course of collecting tax information is not misused.41 In the Tax Reform Act of
1976, Congress reformed section 6103 and eliminated executive discretion regarding
what information could be disclosed to which Federal agencies and established that
tax information is confidential and is only subject to disclosure to the extent
explicitly provided by the Code.42 Congress made this change having determined

38

26 U.S.C. § 6103(a) provides in pertinent part:
(a) General Rule.
Returns and return information shall be confidential, and except as authorized by this
title(1)
No officer or employee of the United States,
(2)
No officer or employee of any State, any local law enforcement agency
receiving information under subsection (i)(7)(A), any local child support
enforcement agency, or any local agency administering a program listed in
subsection (l)(7)(D) who has or had access to returns or return information
under this section, and
(3)
No other person (or officer or employee thereof) who has or had access to
returns or return information under subsection (e)(1)(D)(iii), paragraph (6),
(12), or (16) of subjection (l), paragraph (2) or (4)(B) of subsection (m), or
subsection (n), shall disclose any return or return information obtained by
him in any manner in connection with his services as such an officer or an
employee or otherwise or under the provisions of this section. For purposes
of this subsection, the term “officer or employee” includes a former officer
or employee.
Id.
39

26 U.S.C. § 6103(b)(2)(A) provides in pertinent part that “return information” means-”a
taxpayer’s identity, the nature, source, or amount of his income, payments, receipts,
deductions, exemptions, credits, assets, liabilities, net worth, tax liability, tax withheld,
deficiencies, over assessments, or tax payments. …” Id. (emphasis added)
40

See Allan Karnes & Roger Lirely, Striking Back At the IRS: Using Internal Revenue
Code Provisions To Redress Unauthorized Disclosures of Tax Returns or Return Information,
23 SETON HALL L. REV. 924, 933 (1993).
41

See S. Rep. No. 938, 94th Cong., 2d Spec. Sess. 19, 317-18 (1976).

42

The U.S. Treasury Department reported in 2000 that:

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2002

7

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

8

[Vol. 50:1

that taxpayers must have a reasonable expectation that their information would be
kept private by the IRS.43 Congress also determined that if this expectation of
privacy was abused, the public would lose confidence in the tax system itself.44
The U.S. Treasury Department has previously listed several examples of where
breaches of taxpayer confidentiality have led to compliance problems, including
problems associated with the refund offset program,45 problems associated with
needs-based government programs,46 and problems relating to qualifying for credit.47
By the mid-1970’s, there was increased Congressional and public concern about the
widespread use of tax information by government agencies for purposes unrelated to
tax administration. This concern culminated with a total revision of section 6103 in
the Tax Reform Act of 1976. There, Congress eliminated Executive Discretion
regarding what information could be disclosed to what Federal and state agencies.
Under this second approach, Congress established a new statutory scheme in which
tax information was confidential and not subject to disclosure except to the extent
explicitly provided in the Code. Although there have been many amendments to the
law since that time, the basic statutory scheme established in 1976 remains in place
today.
Report to The Congress on Scope and Use of Taxpayer Confidentiality and Disclosure
Provisions, Volume I: Study of General Provisios, Office of Tax Policy, Department of the
Treasury, (Oct. 2000), Part Two, Section II, Paragraph A, at page 15 (emphasis added)
43

The U.S. Treasury Department reported in 2000 that:
Congress recognized that the IRS had more information about citizens than any other
Federal agency, and that other agencies routinely sought access to that information.
Congress also recognized that citizens reasonably expected that the tax information
they were required to supply to the IRS would be kept private.
Report to The Congress on Scope and Use of Taxpayer Confidentiality and Disclosure
Provisions, Volume I: Study of General Provisions, Office of Tax Policy, Department of the
Treasury, (October, 2000), Part Two, Section II, Paragraph B, Subparagraph 5, at page 21
[hereinafter Taxpayer Confidentiality] (emphasis added).
44

The U.S. Treasury Department reported in 2000 that: “Congress also recognized that
citizens reasonably expected that the tax information they were required to supply to the IRS
would be kept private. If the IRS abused that reasonable expectation of privacy, the loss of
public confidence could seriously impair the tax system.” Id. (emphasis added).
45

The U.S. Treasury Department reported in 2000 that:
Breaching the confidentiality of returns and return information can affect compliance
in several ways. For example, the IRS determined that as a result of the institution of
the refund offset program, some taxpayers changed their withholding (so that there
would be no refund to offset) and a greater number of taxpayers stopped filing returns
altogether. [Footnote 72: Over the period 1985-1988, the IRS found that $719 million
was lost due to an increase in nonfilers, accounting for $621 million of the total, and
an increase in balance-due filers, accounting for the remaining $98 million. Over this
same period, approximately $1.3 billion was offset from the same population. See
IRS Research Division, The Impact of Nontax Refund Offsets on Voluntary
Compliance (Rev. 2/93) at 5-4.]… [T]he integrity of data provided to the IRS by
taxpayers is undermined, diminishing the utility of the data for the very purpose for
which it was originally collected and ultimately disclosed.
Id. at 34 (emphasis added).
46

The U.S. Treasury Department reported in 2000 that:
Overtly tying tax reporting to needs-based government benefits may lead some
individuals to underreport their income in order to qualify for some benefits, thus
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In addition, the U.S. Treasury Department has found that “[t]axpayers who view the
IRS as a resource for a variety of other interests will be less inclined to voluntarily
turn over sensitive financial information out of a fear of where it might ultimately
land.”48
The case law also is very clear that taxpayer confidentiality should be a strong
policy goal in tax administration. For example, the court in Diamond v. U.S49stated
that the legislative purpose of creating section 6103 was to “strengthen taxpayers’
rights,”50 specifically to provide definitive rules relating to the confidentiality of tax
returns due to the prior abuses in that area.51 Similarly, in Flippo v. United States,52
the court discussed the fact that “our voluntary assessment system of tax action is in
large measure dependent upon the realization of a taxpayer’s expectation that the
information required of him would be kept confidential.”53
Moreover, the Internal Revenue Manual, Handbook for Special Agents
(hereinafter Manual) also makes it clear that IRS agents should maintain taxpayer
confidentiality. The Manual provides that: “Caution must be exercised not [to]
damage the reputation of the taxpayer” by making disclosures, even if necessary,
either “offensive or suggestive of any wrongdoing by the taxpayer.”54 The Manual
also warns its agents against even limited or [circular] “mail circularization that may
result in unwarranted embarrassment to the taxpayer.”55
2. Application to KPMG Enforcement Action
It is very likely that the IRS disclosure of the confidential taxpayer information
violates the general rule of section 6103(a). The IRS disclosed the names of
taxpayers by disclosing the unredacted privilege log in the KPMG petition.

jeopardizing tax collections…. [T]he integrity of data provided to the IRS by
taxpayers is undermined, diminishing the utility of the data for the very purpose for
which it was originally collected and ultimately disclosed.
Id. (emphasis added).
47

The U.S. Treasury Department reported in 2000 that:
Conversely, overtly tying tax reporting to the ability to qualify for loans, credit, etc.,
may lead some individuals to overreport their income. … [T]he integrity of data
provided to the IRS by taxpayers is undermined, diminishing the utility of the data for
the very purpose for which it was originally collected and ultimately disclosed.
Id. (emphasis added).
48

See Taxpayer Confidentiality, supra note 43, at 34.

49

944 F.2d 431 (8th Cir. 1991).

50

Id. at 434 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 658, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1975)).

51

Id. at 437.

52

670 F. Supp. 638 (W.D. N.C. 1987), aff’d, 849 F.2d 604 (4th Cir. 1988).

53

Id.

54

Internal Revenue Service, Internal Revenue Manual, Handbook for Special Agents,
§ 347.2 at 9781-11.
55

Diamond, 944 F.2d at 434 (citing to Internal Revenue Service, Internal Revenue Manual,
Handbook for Special Agents § 347.1).
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Taxpayer names are considered “return information” under section 6103.56 As such,
the IRS violated the general rule of section 6103(a) regarding the disclosure of
confidential “return information.”57
In addition, the disclosure was a clear violation of public policy with respect to
the named taxpayers. As discussed above, there exists a strong public policy against
such disclosures as indicated by legislative history,58 the U.S. Treasury Department,59
case law,60 and the Manual.61
B. Exceptions
Two of the exceptions which permit disclosure of “return information” are
disclosure to certain Federal officers and employees for purposes of tax
administration, including the Department of Justice62 and disclosures made in
judicial and administrative proceedings.63 These two exceptions were created by
Congress in order to balance concerns about maintaining taxpayer confidences and
the integrity of the tax system with the need of certain government agencies’ need to
view the information.64
56
26 U.S.C. § 6103(b)(2)(A) provides in pertinent part that “return information” means-“a
taxpayer’s identity, the nature, source, or amount of his income, payments, receipts,
deductions, exemptions, credits, assets, liabilities, net worth, tax liability, tax withheld,
deficiencies, over assessments, or tax payments. …” Id. (emphasis added)
57

26 U.S.C. § 6103(a) provides in pertinent part:
(a) General Rule.
Returns and return information shall be confidential, and except as authorized by this
title(1) No officer or employee of the United States,
(2) No officer or employee of any State, any local law enforcement agency
receiving information under subsection (i)(7)(A), any local child support
enforcement agency, or any local agency administering a program listed in
subsection (l)(7)(D) who has or had access to returns or return information
under this section , and
(3) No other person (or officer or employee thereof) who has or had access to
returns or return information under subsection (e)(1)(D)(iii), paragraph (6),
(12), or (16) of subjection (l), paragraph (2) or (4)(B) of subsection (m), or
subsection (n),shall disclose any return or return information obtained by
him in any manner in connection with his services as such an officer or an
employee or otherwise or under the provisions of this section. For purposes
of this subsection, the term “officer or employee” includes a former officer
or employee.
Id.
58

S. Rep. No. 938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 19, 317-18 (1976).

59

Taxpayer Confidentiality, supra note 43, at 34.

60

Diamond, 944 F.2d at 431.

61

Id. (citing to Internal Revenue Service, Internal Revenue Manual, Handbook for Special
Agents 347.1).
62

26 U.S.C. § 6103(h)(2).

63

26 U.S.C. § 6103(h)(4).

64

The U.S. Treasury Department reported in 2000 that:
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1. Department of Justice Exception
a. General Rule
One of the exceptions that allows disclosure of “return information” involves a
necessary disclosure to the Department of Justice in a court proceeding.65 IRC
section 6103(h)(2) provides in pertinent part that:
In a matter involving tax administration, a return or return information
shall be open to inspection by or disclosure to officers and employees of
the Department of Justice (including United States attorneys) personally
and directly engaged in, and solely for their use in, any proceeding before
a Federal grand jury or preparation for any proceeding (or investigation
which may result in such a proceeding) before a Federal grand jury or
any Federal or State court, but only if-the taxpayer is or may be a party to
the proceeding, or the proceeding arose out of, or in connection with,
determining the taxpayer's civil or criminal liability, or the collection of
such civil liability in respect of any tax imposed under this title;66
the treatment of an item reflected on such return is or may be related to
the resolution of an issue in the proceeding or investigation;67 or
such return or return information relates or may relate to a transactional
relationship between a person who is or may be a party to the proceeding
Although Congress felt that the flow of tax information should be more tightly
regulated, not everyone agreed where the lines should be drawn. The debates on
accessibility were most heated in the area of nontax criminal law enforcement. One
side, led by Senator Long, sought more liberal access rules in order to fight white
collar crime, organized crime, and other violations of the law. This side felt ‘the
Justice Department is part of this Federal Government. It is all one Government.’
[122 Cong. Rec. 23996 (July 27, 1976)(statement of Sen. Long)]. The other side, led
by Senator Weicker, wanted very restrictive rules. This side recognized that it was
cheaper and easier for the Justice Department to come directly to the IRS. But they
also felt that when citizens prepared their tax returns, they prepared them for the IRS,
and no one else.
Ultimately, Congress amended section 6103 to provide that tax returns and
return information are confidential and are not subject to disclosure, except in limited
situations, as delineated by the Code, where disclosure is warranted. In each area of
allowable disclosure, Congress attempted to balance the particular office or agency’s
need for the information with the citizen’s right to privacy, as well as the impact of the
disclosure upon the continuation of compliance with the voluntary tax assessment
system. [Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., General
Explanation of the Tax Reform Act of 1976, 313-16 (Comm. Print 1976)]. In short,
Congress undertook direct responsibility for determining the types and manner of
permissible disclosures.
Taxpayer Confidentiality, supra note 43, at 22 (emphasis added).
65

26 U.S.C. § 6103(h)(2).

66

26 U.S.C. § 6103(h)(2)(A) (emphasis added).

67

26 U.S.C. § 6103(h)(2)(B) (emphasis added).
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and the taxpayer which affects, or may affect, the resolution of an issue in
such proceeding or investigation.”68
b. Application to KPMG Enforcement Action
It is unlikely that the first of the three above exception subsections (hereinafter
DOJ Collection Exception)69 applies to the KPMG case. The summons enforcement
action was directed at KPMG and not the named taxpayers. The summons
enforcement action proceeding did not arise out of, or in connection with,
determining the named taxpayer's civil or criminal liability, or the collection of the
named taxpayer’s civil tax liability. While it is possible that at some point, the
named taxpayers could become a party to the proceeding, this possibility does not
appear strong enough to allow for an exception to the general rule regarding taxpayer
confidentiality. In addition, the IRS has yet to allege that the named taxpayers owe
additional taxes, interest or penalties in the summons enforcement action. Rather,
the IRS is in the information gathering stage in the summons enforcement action,
making a current disclosure of the named taxpayer’s information premature with
respect to the DOJ Collection Exception’s application.
It is also unlikely that the second of the three above exception subsections
(hereinafter DOJ Resolution Exception)70 applies to the KPMG case. The summons
enforcement action was not seeking to resolve the treatment on the return of KPMG,
who was the “taxpayer” in the summons enforcement action. It is certainly possible
that the named taxpayers’ returns could become a subject to examination by the IRS,
this proceeding has not called the named taxpayers’ returns into question. As such,
making a current disclosure of the named taxpayer’s information does not appear to
be covered by the DOJ Resolution Exception.
The third of the above exception subsections is the most likely candidate to apply
to the KPMG case (hereinafter DOJ Transactional Exception).
The DOJ
Transactional Exception involves disclosure of return information that relates or may
relate to a transactional relationship between a person who is or may be a party to the
proceeding and the taxpayer which affects, or may affect, the resolution of an issue
in such proceeding or investigation.71 The nature of the transactional relationship
between the named taxpayers and KPMG is what was disclosed by the IRS. KPMG
is clearly a party to the summons enforcement action. As such, it is possible that the
IRS could argue that the release of the taxpayer’s name in the context of resolving
the summons compliance issue is covered by the DOJ Transactional Exception.
However, this is not likely to be a successful argument, as the IRS would have a
difficult time proving that the release of the named taxpayer’s otherwise confidential
information was necessary in any way to resolve whether KPMG was required to
comply with the summonses. The IRS did not need to release the names of the
named taxpayers in order to enforce the summonses. The IRS could have redacted
the names of the individual taxpayers from the petition and made the same

68

26 U.S.C. § 6103(h)(2)(C) (emphasis added).

69

26 U.S.C. § 6103(h)(2)(A).

70

26 U.S.C. § 6103(h)(2)(B).

71

26 U.S.C. § 6103(h)(2)(C).
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arguments regarding enforcement of the summonses. Had the IRS simply redacted
the named taxpayers’ confidential information from the petition, the IRS could have
still sought compliance from KPMG while protecting the taxpayers’ confidential
information. As such, it is unlikely that the DOJ Transactional Exception covers the
IRS’ disclosure.
2. Judicial and Administrative Proceeding Exception
a. General Rule
A second of the exceptions which allows disclosure of “return information”
involves a necessary disclosure in an administrative or judicial proceeding.72 Tax
Analysts has reported that the IRS is relying on this exception for its disclosure.73
IRC section 6103(h)(4) provides in pertinent part that:
A return or return information may be disclosed in a Federal or State
judicial or administrative proceeding pertaining to tax administration, but
only— if the taxpayer is a party to the proceeding, or the proceeding arose
out of, or in connection with, determining the taxpayer's civil or criminal
liability, or the collection of such civil liability, in respect of any tax
imposed under this title;74 if the treatment of an item reflected on such
return is directly related to the resolution of an issue in the proceeding;75 if
such return or return information directly relates to a transactional
relationship between a person who is a party to the proceeding and the
taxpayer which directly affects the resolution of an issue in the
proceeding;76 or to the extent required by order of a court pursuant to
section 3500 of title 18, United States Code or rule 16 of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure, such court being authorized in the issuance
of such order to give due consideration to congressional policy favoring
the confidentiality of returns and return information as set forth in this
title. However, such return or return information shall not be disclosed as
provided in the above subparagraphs if the Secretary determines that such
disclosure would identify a confidential informant or seriously impair a
civil or criminal tax investigation.77

72

26 U.S.C. § 6103(h)(2).

73

Tax Analysts’ reported that:
According to a source familiar with the case, the government is relying on section
6103(h)(4)(A), which allows for the disclosure of taxpayer information in a judicial
tax proceeding if the taxpayer is a party to the proceeding or the proceeding arises out
of a determination of the taxpayer’s liability.
Amy Hamilton, Shelter Customer Disclosure Affects California Campaign, 2002 TAX NOTES
TODAY 138-5 (July 17, 2002).
74

26 U.S.C. § 6103(h)(4)(A).

75

26 U.S.C. § 6103(h)(4)(B).

76

26 U.S.C. § 6103(h)(4)(C).

77

26 U.S.C. § 6103(h)(4)(D).
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b. Application to KPMG Enforcement Action
It has been reported that the IRS believes the first of the four above exception
subsections (hereinafter Administrative Collection Exception)78 applies to the KPMG
case.79 As discussed above, the summons enforcement action was directed at KPMG.
The summons enforcement action was not directed at the named taxpayers.80 The
possibility that the named taxpayers could become a party to the proceeding at some
future date does not appear strong enough to allow for the IRS to have violated the
general rule regarding taxpayer confidentiality. Also, as discussed above, the
summons enforcement action did not arise out of, or in connection with, determining
the named taxpayer’s civil or criminal liability, or the collection of the named
taxpayer’s civil tax liability. The summons enforcement action did not allege that
the named taxpayers owe additional taxes, interest, or penalties. As such, the
Administrative Collection Exception does not appear to apply to the IRS’ disclosure.
It is also unlikely that the second of the four above exception subsections
(hereinafter Administrative Resolution Exception)81 applies to the KPMG case. As
discussed above, the summons enforcement action was not seeking to resolve the
treatment on the return of KPMG.82 KPMG was the “taxpayer” in the summons
enforcement action and the summons enforcement action has not called the named

78

26 U.S.C. § 6103(h)(4)(A).

79

Tax Analysts’ reported that:
In the government’s view, attaching KPMG’s privilege logs to the petition is permitted
under section 6103(h)(4)(A); which allows disclosure which allows disclosure of
return information if the taxpayer is a party to a proceeding that arises out of a
determination of the taxpayer’s liability. The government interprets broadly the
definition of return information. KPMG is the taxpayer to the proceeding, and its
privilege logs are considered the firm’s tax information, according to a source familiar
with the case.
As for the argument that the names of KPMG’s clients are their own tax
information, the government’s position is that the privilege logs contain names of
recipients of documents. Whether those names are return information depends on
whether the names are part of a file or an investigation of those other people,
according to the source. The government’s analysis for purposes of this enforcement
action is that KPMG is the taxpayer under investigation, and that it does not know
whether the privilege log descriptions contain anyone else’s tax return information.
All the information in the privilege logs are “other data” and are the “return
information” of KPMG, the source explained the government’s argument. The Justice
Department reasons that just because a person’s name is mentioned in a document
given to the IRS doesn’t mean that the document, or that part of the document, is the
person’s return information. For example, the source explained, information obtained
by the IRS in the examination of A becomes the “return information” of A and not B,
even if that information also mentions B. In the government’s view, the document is
the return information of the person whose liability is under examination.”
Taxpayer Confidentiality: Civilian Casualty in War on Shelters?, 2002 TAX NOTES TODAY
140-1 (July 19, 2002) (hereinafter Civilian Casualty).
80

Id.

81

26 U.S.C. § 6103(h)(4)(B).

82

Id.
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taxpayers’ returns into question. As such, the Administrative Resolution Exception
does not appear to apply to the IRS’ disclosure.
The third of the four above exception subsections (hereinafter Administrative
Transactional Exception)83 provides the IRS’ best case for justifying the disclosure of
the named taxpayers’ information. However, it has been reported that the IRS is not
relying on this section.84 The Administrative Transactional Exception involves
disclosure of return information that relates or may relate to a transactional
relationship between a person who is or may be a party to the proceeding and the
taxpayer which affects, or may affect, the resolution of an issue in such proceeding
or investigation.85 Clearly, there existed a transactional relationship between the
named taxpayers and KPMG, and the documents relating to the transactions that
linked the named taxpayers and KPMG are what the IRS is seeking to have KPMG
disclose. It is clear that KPMG is a party to the summons enforcement action, and
thus, the IRS might make the argument that in seeking to enforce compliance with
the summonses, the release of the named taxpayer’s information is covered by the
Administrative Transactional Exception. However, as discussed above, this is not
likely to be a successful argument, because the IRS would likely be unable to
establish that enforcing compliance with the summonses required the release of the
named taxpayer’s confidential information. The IRS could have made the same
arguments regarding enforcement of the summonses while redacting the names of
the involved taxpayers from the petition. As such, it is unlikely that the
Administrative Transactional Exception covers the IRS’ disclosure.
The last of the four above exception subsections86 is not likely to apply to the
KPMG case because there was no court order issued that required the disclosure.
IV. SECTION 7431
A. General Rule
An unauthorized disclosure of taxpayer information can lead to a cause of
action.87 The cause of action may arise either where the disclosure is made by an
employee of the United States (such as an IRS agent)88 or by a person not employed
by the United States.89 IRC section 7431(a) provides in pertinent part that:
If any officer or employee of the United States knowingly, or by reason of
negligence, inspects or discloses any return or return information with
respect to a taxpayer in violation of any provision of Section 6103, such

83

26 U.S.C. § 6103(h)(4)(C).

84

See Civilian Casualty, supra note 79, at 140-1.

85

26 U.S.C. § 6103(h)(4)(C).

86

26 U.S.C. § 6103(h)(4)(D).

87

I.R.C. § 7431.

88

I.R.C. § 7431(a)(1).

89

I.R.C. § 7431(a)(2).
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taxpayer may bring a civil action for damages against the United States in
a district court of the United States,90 and
If any person who is not an officer or employee of the United States
knowingly, or by reason of negligence, inspects or discloses any return or
return information with respect to a taxpayer in violation of any provision
of Section 6103, such taxpayer may bring a civil action for damages
against such person in a district court of the United States.91
B. Statute of Limitations
The statute of limitations for bringing the cause of action is two years from the
date of discovery by the claimant.92
C. Good Faith but Erroneous Interpretation Exception
No cause of action may arise where the disclosing party meets one of the
exceptions to Section 7431.93 One of these exceptions is where the disclosing party
has a good faith, but erroneous, interpretation of section 6103.94
Section 7431 does not define what constitutes a “good faith” interpretation of
Section 6103. Only one District Court has held that the standard is a subjective
test,95 while the Fifth Circuit,96 Sixth Circuit97 and Eighth Circuit98 have all held that
the standard is an objective test. For example, in Diamond v. United States, the

90

I.R.C. § 7431(a)(1) (emphasis added).

91

I.R.C. § 7431(a)(2) (emphasis added).

92

I.R.C. § 7431(d) provides in pertinent part: “Notwithstanding any other provision of
law, an action to enforce any liability created under this section may be brought, without
regard to the amount in controversy, at any time within 2 years after the date of discovery by
the plaintiff of the unauthorized inspection or disclosure.” Id. (emphasis added)
93

I.R.C. § 7431(b) provides in pertinent part: “No liability shall arise under this section
with respect to any inspection or disclosure- (1) which results from a good faith, but
erroneous, interpretation of section 6103, or (2) which is requested by the taxpayer.” Id.
(emphasis added.)
94

I.R.C. § 7431(b)(1).

95

See Taylor v. United States, 186 B.R. 441, 450-51 (N.D. Iowa 1995) (citing to Lebaron
v. United States, 794 F. Supp. 947, 954 (C.D. Cal. 1992) (noting that only the district court for
the district of Minnesota had interpreted the good faith standard to contain a subjective
element).
96
See generally Huckaby v. United States, 794 F.2d 1041, 1048 (5th Cir. 1986); see also
Gandy v. United States, 234 F. 3d 281 (5th Cir. 2000) (affirming the application of the good
faith standard of § 7431 should be determined by an objective standard); Payne v. United
States, 289 F.3d 377 (5th Cir. 2002) (noting that the fifth circuit evaluates good faith under an
objective standard).
97

See Taylor, 186 B.R. at 450-51.

98

See generally Diamond, 944 F.2d at 431; see also Rorex v. Traynor, 771 F. 2d 383, 387
(8th Cir. 1985).
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Eighth Circuit held that the “good faith” test is an objective test.99 The Court’s logic
was partly based on the fact that the predecessor statute to section 7431 called for an
objective standard to apply.100 In addition, the Court held that the objective test was
met by the United States where the United States correctly interpreted section 6103
and the individual agent misinterpreted section 6103.101 The Court explained that the
objective standard is met where a government official is not liable for purposes of
the “good faith” test, provided that such official’s conduct does not violate statutory
or constitutional rights of which a “reasonable person would have known.”102 The
Sixth Circuit has held that the objective test is measured by what a “reasonable IRS
agent” would have known.103 As such, the “good faith” test for purposes of section
7431 appears to be a broader test that is more easily met than the test for meeting an
exception to Section 6103. Essentially, if an average IRS agent would reasonably
believe that the agent was not committing a section 6103 violation, then no Section
7431 cause of action will be permitted, even if an actual violation of Section 6103
has occurred.
D. Damages
A defendant found to have violated this provision104 could be liable for
significant damages.105 Such damages would be the sum of three amounts.106 The

99

Diamond, 944 F.2d at 435-36 (citing to Rorex, 771 F.2d at 387).

100

Id.

101

Husby v. United States, 672 F. Supp. 442, 445 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (holding that the IRS
cannot collectively qualify as having met the good faith test); but see Diamond, 944 F2d. at
435 n.7 (distinguishing Husby by stating that neither legal nor logical support was offered for
this holding).
102
Diamond, 944 F.2d at 431 (citing Rorex, 771 F.2d at 387) (explaining that government
officials are generally shielded from litigation when performing discretionary functions unless
such function is a clear violation of statutory rights of a taxpayer) (citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald,
457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
103
See Gandy v. United States, 234 F.3d 281, 285 (5th Cir. 2000); see also Payne, 289
F.3d at 384.
104

I.R.C. § 7431.

105

I.R.C. § 7431(c).

106

I.R.C. § 7431(c) provides in pertinent part:
In any action brought under section (a), upon a finding of liability on the part of the
defendant, the defendant shall be liable to the plaintiff in an amount equal to the sum
of(1) the greater of –
(A) $1,000 for each act of unauthorized inspection or disclosure of a return or
return information with respect to which such defendant is found liable, or
(B) the sum of(i) the actual damages sustained by the plaintiff as a result of such
unauthorized inspection or disclosure, plus
(ii) in the case of a willful inspection or disclosure or an inspection or
disclosure which is the result of gross negligence, punitive damages, plus
(2) the cost of the action, plus
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first of these three is the greater of either (i) $1,000 per disclosure107 or (ii) actual
damages of the taxpayer108 plus punitive damages where the disclosure was willful or
due to gross negligence.109 The second of these three is the costs of the action.110
The final of these is the party’s reasonable attorney’s fees,111 where certain
conditions are met112 and these conditions differ depending on whether the United
States is the disclosing party113 or the disclosing party is not the United States.114
1. Disclosing Party is Not United States
With respect to where the IRS is not the disclosing party, reasonable attorney’s
fees may be awarded only where the taxpayer is a “prevailing party” within the
meaning provided in 26 U.S.C.S. § 7430(c)(4)(A)(ii).115 The definition of a
“prevailing party” for purposes of I.R.C. § 7430(c)(4)(A)(ii) is a taxpayer who either
(1) submits certain filings with the court that justify the taxpayer’s procedural
requirements for attorney fees or (2) meets certain net worth requirements. These
requirements are set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B) and 28 U.S.C.
§ 2412(d)(2)(B), both of which are referenced in 26 U.S.C.S. § 7430(c)(4)(A)(ii).
Section 7430(c)(4)(A)(ii) provides that a “prevailing party” is a taxpayer who
meets the requirements of the first sentence of section 2412(d)(1)(B) of title 28,
United States Code, except to the extent differing procedures are established by rule

(3) in the case of a plaintiff which is described in section 7430(c)(4)(A)(ii),
reasonable attorneys fees, except that if the defendant is the United States, reasonable
attorneys fees may be awarded only if the plaintiff is the prevailing party (as
determined under section 7430(c)(4)).
Id. (emphasis added.)
107

I.R.C. § 7431(c)(1)(A).

108

I.R.C. § 7431(c)(1)(B)(i).

109

I.R.C. § 7431(c)(1)(B)(ii).

110

I.R.C. § 7431(c)(2).

111

I.R.C. § 7431(c)(3).

112

I.R.C. § 7431(c)(3) sets out different conditions depending on whether the United States
is the disclosing party. I.R.C. § 7431(c)(3) provides in pertinent part: “In the case of a
plaintiff which is described in section 7430(c)(4)(A)(ii), reasonable attorneys fees, except that
if the defendant is the United States, reasonable attorneys fees may be awarded only if the
plaintiff is the prevailing party (as determined under section 7430(c)(4)).” Id. (emphasis
added)
113
If the United States is the disclosing party, then I.R.C. § 7431(c)(3) provides that
reasonable attorneys fees may be awarded for taxpayers described in I.R.C.
§ 7430(c)(4)(A)(ii) and the taxpayer is the prevailing party as determined in 26 U.S.C.
§ 7430(c)(4).
114
If the United States is not the disclosing party, then I.R.C. § 7431(c)(3) provides that
reasonable attorneys fees may be awarded for taxpayers described in 26 U.S.C.
§ 7430(c)(4)(A)(ii).
115

I.R.C. § 7431(c)(3).
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of court and meet the requirements of section 2412(d)(2)(B) of title 28.116 The first
sentence of title 28, section 2412(d)(1)(B) provides:
A party seeking an award of fees and other expenses shall, within thirty
days of final judgment in the action, submit to the court an application for
fees and other expenses which shows that the party is a prevailing party
and is eligible to receive an award under this subsection, and the amount
sought, including an itemized statement from any attorney or expert
witness representing or appearing in behalf of the party stating the actual
time expended and the rate at which fees and other expenses were
computed.117
In addition, Title 28, section 2412(d)(2)(B) provides in pertinent part:
“party” means-118
an individual whose net worth did not exceed $2,000,000 at the time the
civil action was filed,119 or
any owner of an unincorporated business, or any partnership, corporation,
association, unit of local government, or organization, the net worth of
which did not exceed $7,000,000 at the time the civil action was filed, and
which had not more than 500 employees at the time the civil action was
filed; except that an organization described in section 501(c)(3) of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (26 U.S.C. 501(c)(3)) exempt from
taxation under section 501(a) of such Code, or a cooperative association
as defined in section 15(a) of the Agricultural Marketing Act (12 U.S.C.
1141j(a)), may be a party regardless of the net worth of such organization
or cooperative association or for purposes of subsection (d)(1)(D), a small
entity as defined in section 601 of title 5.120
Lastly, there are special rules set forth for meeting the above net worth
requirement where the taxpayer is an estate,121 a trust,122 a joint filer,123 or where the
eventual judgment is less than the taxpayer’s offer.124
116

26 U.S.C.§ 7430(c)(4)(A)(ii).

117

28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B) (emphasis added).

118

28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(B).

119

28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(B)(i) (emphasis added).

120

28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(B)(ii) (emphasis added).

121

26 U.S.C. § 7430(c)(4)(D)(i)(I) provides the following:
Special rules for applying net worth requirement. In applying the requirements of
section 2412(d)(2)(B) of title 28, United States Code, for purposes of subparagraph
(A)(ii) of this paragraph —
(i) the net worth limitation in clause (i) of such section shall apply to —
(I) an estate but shall be determined as of the date of the decedent’s death .…
Id.
122

26 U.S.C. § 7430(c)(4)(D)(i)(II) provides the following:
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2. Disclosing Party is United States
Where the disclosing party is the United States, reasonable attorney’s fees may
be awarded only where the taxpayer both (1) meets the definition of a “prevailing
party” for purposes of IRC § 7430(c)(4)(A)(ii), as outlined above, as either a
taxpayer who submits certain filings with the court that justify the taxpayer’s
procedural requirements for attorney fees125 or meets certain net worth

Special rules for applying net worth requirement. In applying the requirements of
section 2412(d)(2)(B) of title 28, United States Code , for purposes of subparagraph
(A)(ii) of this paragraph —
(i) the net worth limitation in clause (i) of such section shall apply to —
(II) a trust but shall be determined as of the last day of the taxable year
involved in the proceeding .…
Id.
123

26 U.S.C. § 7430(c)(4)(D)(ii) provides the following:
Special rules for applying net worth requirement. In applying the requirements of
section 2412(d)(2)(B) of title 28, United States Code , for purposes of subparagraph
(A)(ii) of this paragraph —
(ii) individuals filing a joint return shall be treated as separate individuals for
purposes of clause (i) of such section.”
Id.
124

26 U.S.C. § 7430(c)(4)(E) provides the following:
Special rules where judgment less than taxpayer's offer.
In general. A party to a court proceeding meeting the requirements of
subparagraph (A)(ii) shall be treated as the prevailing party if the liability of the
taxpayer pursuant to the judgment in the proceeding (determined without regard to
interest) is equal to or less than the liability of the taxpayer which would have been so
determined if the United States had accepted a qualified offer of the party under
subsection (g) .
(ii) Exceptions. This subparagraph shall not apply to—
(I) any judgment issued pursuant to a settlement; or
(II) any proceeding in which the amount of tax liability is not in issue,
including any declaratory judgment proceeding, any proceeding to enforce
or quash any summons issued pursuant to this title, and any action to
restrain disclosure under section 6110(f) .
(iii) Special rules. If this subparagraph applies to any court proceeding—
(I) the determination under clause (i) shall be made by reference to the last
qualified offer made with respect to the tax liability at issue in the
proceeding; and
(II) reasonable administrative and litigation costs shall only include costs
incurred on and after the date of such offer.
(iv) Coordination. This subparagraph shall not apply to a party which is a
prevailing party under any other provision of this paragraph. (emphasis added)
Id.
125

28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B).
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requirements,126 and (2) is the “prevailing party”127 in the lawsuit with the United
States as provided in IRC § 7430(c)(4).128
IRC § 7430(c)(4) provides in pertinent part:
In general. The term “prevailing party” means any party in any
proceeding to which subsection (a)129 applies (other than the United States
or any creditor of the taxpayer involved)— 130
which— 131
has substantially prevailed with respect to the amount in controversy,132 or
has substantially prevailed with respect to the most significant issue or set
of issues presented,133 and
which meets the requirements of the 1st sentence of section 2412(d)(1)(B)
of title 28, United States Code (as in effect on October 22, 1986) except to
the extent differing procedures are established by rule of court and meets
the requirements of section 2412(d)(2)(B) of such title 28 (as so in
effect).134
As such, the general definition of “prevailing party” for purposes of IRC
§ 7430(c)(4) is a taxpayer who has either prevailed as to the amount in controversy135
or has prevailed on the issue in the case.136

126

28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(B).

127

I.R.C. § 7431(c)(3).

128

I.R.C. § 7431(c)(3).

129

26 U.S.C. § 7430(a) provides in pertinent part:
(a) In general.
In any administrative or court proceeding which is brought by or against the
United States in connection with the determination, collection, or refund of any tax,
interest, or penalty under this title, the prevailing party may be awarded a judgment or
a settlement for—
(1) reasonable administrative costs incurred in connection with such
administrative proceeding within the Internal Revenue Service, and
(2) reasonable litigation costs incurred in connection with such court proceeding.
Id.
130

26 U.S.C. § 7430(c)(4)(A).

131

26 U.S.C. § 7430(c)(4)(A)(i).

132

26 U.S.C. § 7430(c)(4)(A)(i)(I).

133

26 U.S.C. § 7430(c)(4)(A)(i)(II).

134

26 U.S.C. § 7430(c)(4)(A)(ii).

135

26 U.S.C. § 7430(c)(4)(A)(i)(I).

136

26 U.S.C. § 7430(c)(4)(A)(i)(II).
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However, the United States may not be liable where its position can be
substantially justified. With respect to this exception, IRC § 7430(c)(4) provides in
pertinent part:
Exception if United States establishes that its position was substantially
justified.137
General rule. A party shall not be treated as the prevailing party in a
proceeding to which subsection (a) applies if the United States establishes
that the position of the United States in the proceeding was substantially
justified.138
Presumption of no justification if Internal Revenue Service did not follow
certain published guidance. For purposes of [the General Rule],139 the
position of the United States shall be presumed not to be substantially
justified if the Internal Revenue Service did not follow its applicable
published guidance140 in the administrative proceeding. Such presumption
may be rebutted.141
Effect of losing on substantially similar issues. In determining for
purposes of [the General Rule]142 whether the position of the United States
was substantially justified, the court shall take into account whether the
United States has lost in courts of appeal for other circuits on
substantially similar issues.143
Thus, even where the taxpayer has satisfied the general rule, the taxpayer will
still not be the “prevailing party” where the United States either: “(1) establishes
that its position in the proceeding was substantially justified; 144 or (2) the IRS
137

26 U.S.C. § 7430(c)(4)(B).

138

26 U.S.C. § 7430(c)(4)(B)(i).

139

The bracketed information has replaced the term “clause (i)” to better allow the reader
to follow the flow of the statute.
140

26 U.S.C. § 7430(c)(4)(B)(iv) specifies what constitutes “applicable published
guidance.” IRC § 7430(c)(4)(B)(iv) provides:
(iv) Applicable published guidance. For purposes of clause (ii), the term “applicable
published guidance” means—
(I) regulations, revenue rulings, revenue procedures, information releases,
notices, and announcements, and
(II) any of the following which are issued to the taxpayer: private letter rulings,
technical advice memoranda, and determination letters. (emphasis added)
Id.
141

26 U.S.C. § 7430(c)(4)(B)(ii) (emphasis added).

142

The bracketed information has replaced the term “clause (i)” to better allow the reader
to follow the flow of the statute.
143

26 U.S.C. § 7430(c)(4)(B)(iii) (emphasis added).

144

26 U.S.C. § 7430(c)(4)(B).
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properly followed its own ‘applicable published guidance’145 in the administrative
proceeding,”146 provided that, the proper authority does not determine that the United
States has lost in courts of appeal for other circuits on substantially similar issues147
and (1) or (2) above is determined by the proper authority.148
E. Application to KPMG Enforcement Action
The IRS disclosure of confidential taxpayer names appears to meet the general
rule giving rise to a cause of action.149 As discussed above, the general rule provides,
in pertinent part, that a civil cause of action against the United States for damages
arises where an employee of the United States knowingly or negligently, discloses
any return information with respect to a taxpayer in violation of any provision of
section 6103.150 The petitioning party that disclosed the named taxpayers in the
privilege log was the United States. Thus, an employee of the United States must
have prepared the petition. It is clear that confidential taxpayer return information
was disclosed when the named taxpayers were identified upon the privilege log
becoming public information. As such, provided there was a violation of section
6103, the named taxpayers likely meet the general rule for having a cause of action
against the United States.
It is unlikely, however, that the named taxpayers would recover damages from a
cause of action against the United States for a violation of section 6103. The United
States is likely to have a successful defense of any such cause of action by meeting
145
26 U.S.C. § 7430(c)(4)(B)(iv) specifies what constitutes “applicable published
guidance.” IRC § 7430(c)(4)(B)(iv) provides:
(iv) Applicable published guidance. For purposes of clause (ii), the term “applicable
published guidance” means—
(I) regulations, revenue rulings, revenue procedures, information releases,
notices, and announcements, and
(II) any of the following which are issued to the taxpayer: private letter rulings,
technical advice memoranda, and determination letters. (emphasis added)
Id.
146

26 U.S.C. § 7430(c)(4)(B)(ii).

147

26 U.S.C. § 7430(c)(4)(B)(iii).

148

26 U.S.C. § 7430(c)(4)(C) sets forth that if the parties cannot agree as to who the
“prevailing party” is for purposes of IRC § 7430(c)(4), then the IRS shall make the
determination if the issue is resolved at the administrative level, and the determination shall be
made by the court where the issue is resolved in court. IRC § 7430(c)(4)(C) provides in
pertinent part:
(C) Determination as to prevailing party. Any determination under this paragraph as
to whether a party is a prevailing party shall be made by agreement of the parties
or—
(i) in the case where the final determination with respect to the tax, interest, or
penalty is made at the administrative level, by the Internal Revenue Service, or
(ii) in the case where such final determination is made by a court, the court.
(emphasis added)
Id.
149

I.R.C. § 7431(a)(1).

150

I.R.C. § 7431(a)(1).
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the exception where the disclosing party has a good faith, but erroneous,
interpretation of section 6103.151 In the present case, based on reported IRS
commentary, it appears that the IRS had a subjective good faith belief that disclosure
of the privilege log did not violate section 6103.152 However, as discussed above, the
objective “good faith” test is met based on what a reasonable IRS agent can be
expected to know. As such, it appears that the IRS would have an easier time
meeting the section 7431 “good faith” test than the IRS would have meeting an
exception to section 6103. Provided that an average IRS agent would believe that
there had been no section 6103 violation, then a taxpayer would be unlikely to
succeed in bringing a section 7431 cause of action, even if the IRS had committed an
actual violation of section 6103.
Here, it also appears that the IRS may satisfy the objective test by arguing that an
average IRS agent would believe that the KPMG privilege logs were permitted
disclosures under section 6103(h)(4)(A). The IRS would argue that a reasonable IRS
agent would believe that disclosure of return information is permitted because
KPMG is a party to a proceeding that arises out of a determination of KPMG’s
liability. The government would argue that KPMG is the taxpayer to the proceeding,
and its privilege logs are considered KPMG’s tax information. The government
would further argue that the privilege logs contain names of recipients of documents
and the government would take the position that any disclosure is incidental to
KPMG’s enforcement action and that as a result, a reasonable IRS agent would not
know whether the privilege log descriptions contain anyone else’s tax return
information. Essentially, the named taxpayers’ names became part of KPMG’s
return information and therefore, since KPMG is the taxpayer under investigation,

151

I.R.C. § 7431(b)(1).

152

Tax Analysts’ reported that:
In the government’s view, attaching KPMG’s privilege logs to the petition is permitted
under section 6103(h)(4)(A); which allows disclosure of return information if the
taxpayer is a party to a proceeding that arises out of a determination of the taxpayer’s
liability. The government interprets broadly the definition of return information.
KPMG is the taxpayer to the proceeding, and its privilege logs are considered the
firm’s tax information, according to a source familiar with the case.
As for the argument that the names of KPMG’s clients are their own tax
information, the government’s position is that the privilege logs contain names of
recipients of documents. Whether those names are return information depends on
whether the names are part of a file or an investigation of those other people,
according to the source. The government’s analysis for purposes of this enforcement
action is that KPMG is the taxpayer under investigation, and that it does not know
whether the privilege log descriptions contain anyone else’s tax return information.
All the information in the privilege logs are “other data” and are the “return
information” of KPMG, the source explained the government’s argument. The Justice
Department reasons that just because a person’s name is mentioned in a document
given to the IRS doesn’t mean that the document, or that part of the document, is the
person’s return information. For example, the source explained, information obtained
by the IRS in the examination of A becomes the “return information” of A and not B,
even if that information also mentions B. In the government’s view, the document is
the return information of the person whose liability is under examination.”
See Civilian Casualty, supra note 79, at 140-1.
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the IRS may disclose KPMG’s return information in the enforcement action under
section 6103(h)(4)(A).
Based on the lower threshold, it is likely that the IRS would succeed on the
“good faith” defense of any section 7431 cause of action. For purposes of this
Article, it is assumed that the IRS could meet this standard by evidencing that
KPMG was the taxpayer in the summons enforcement action and that the IRS’
internal policies allowed disclosure of third party names when filing a petition to
enforce KPMG’s summonses. If Tax Analysts succeeds in its FOIA requests of the
government, the decision making process of the government on this matter will be
revealed and we will be able to determine whether this assumption is correct.
V. CONCLUSION
The IRS has been battling the former “Big Five” (now “Big Four”) accounting
firms and certain other promoters for years over their alleged marketing of tax
shelters.153 On January 28, 2002, the IRS issued its first summons to one of the Big
Four accounting firms, KPMG, requesting that KPMG provide documents relating to
two alleged tax shelters154 allegedly promoted by KPMG.155 The IRS subsequently
issued several other summonses to KPMG relating to additional alleged tax shelters
purportedly promoted by KPMG.156 While providing the IRS with several boxes of
documents and sworn testimony, KPMG also created a privilege log containing a list
of documents relating to participants in the alleged tax shelters.157 The IRS
responded to KPMG’s document production and privilege log by refuting KPMG’s
privilege claim and requesting additional documents not previously requested.158 On
July 9, 2002, the IRS filed a summons enforcement action lawsuit against KPMG.159
The IRS included the privilege log as part of its petition in the summons enforcement
action.160 The IRS did not redact the names of the taxpayers who whose documents
were contained in the privilege log, regardless of the fact that the taxpayers were not
parties to the IRS lawsuit.161 The public disclosure of these taxpayers’ relationship
with KPMG in the context of alleged tax shelter activity became public knowledge.
The WSJ disclosed many of the taxpayer names in a front page article.162 The
153
Tax Notes Today has reported that all the former Big Five accounting firms have been
served with summonses relating to the alleged promotion of tax shelters. See PWC Deal
Heads Off Shelter Summons Enforcement, 2002 TAX NOTES TODAY 125-1 (June 27, 2002).
154

The two alleged tax shelters were the FLIP and the OPIS strategies. See Petition, supra
note 8.
155

See Lupi-Sher, supra note 22, at 133-34.

156

See Petition, supra note 8.

157

See Lupi-Sher, supra note 22, at 133-34.

158

The IRS claimed that KPMG had failed to produce 1,129 of the 1,162 documents listed
in the privilege log. See Petition, supra note 8.
159

Id.

160

Id.

161

Id.

162

Id.
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disclosure of the taxpayer names caused a strong public reaction and subsequently,
the IRS Office of Chief Counsel issued new guidelines that likely would have
foreclosed the disclosures had the guidelines been in existence prior to the public
disclosure.163 Freedom of Information Act requests have been made by Tax Analysts
to the U.S. Treasury Department,164 the IRS165 and DOJ166 seeking to discover
internal government documents relating to who made this decision and how it was
made. Section 6103 provides that the IRS must maintain the confidentiality of
certain taxpayer information, subject to certain exceptions.167 Section 6103(a) sets
forth the general rule that taxpayer “return information” is generally confidential,
subject to certain exceptions.168
Section 6103(b)(2) provides that “return
163

IRS Release, supra note 34.

164

Tax Analysts sent a Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) request to the U.S Treasury
Department seeking several documents, as described below:
In particular, the FOIA request seeks any materials discussing the decision to attach
privilege logs containing KPMG client names. … Tax Analysts has asked for copies
of any documentation discussing the decision to release to the press the petitions and
some attachments on the day filed, and the court filings in electronic form soon
afterward. The FOIA requests also seek memos or documents relating to the letters to
the editor of the Wall Street Journal that were written by officials in the Treasury, IRS,
and Justice Department, including draft versions of the letters.
Dobrovir, supra note 15, at 153-28.
165

Tax Analysts sent a Freedom of Information Act or FOIA request to the IRS seeking
several documents, as described below:
In particular, the FOIA request seeks any materials discussing the decision to attach
privilege logs containing KPMG client names. … Tax Analysts has asked for copies
of any documentation discussing the decision to release to the press the petitions and
some attachments on the day filed, and the court filings in electronic form soon
afterward. The FOIA requests also seek memos or documents relating to the letters to
the editor of the Wall Street Journal that were written by officials in the Treasury, IRS,
and Justice Department, including draft versions of the letters.
Dobrovir, supra note 15, at 153-39.
166

Tax Analysts sent a Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) request to the U.S Justice
Department seeking several documents, as described below:
In particular, the FOIA request seeks any materials discussing the decision to attach
privilege logs containing KPMG client names. … Tax Analysts has asked for copies
of any documentation discussing the decision to release to the press the petitions and
some attachments on the day filed, and the court filings in electronic form soon
afterward. The FOIA requests also seek memos or documents relating to the letters to
the editor of the Wall Street Journal that were written by officials in the Treasury, IRS,
and Justice Department, including draft versions of the letters.
Dobrovir, supra note 15, at 153-41.
167

26 U.S.C. § 6103.

168

26 U.S.C. § 6103(a) provides in pertinent part:
(a) General Rule.
Returns and return information shall be confidential, and except as authorized by this
title(1) No officer or employee of the United States,
(2) No officer or employee of any State, any local law enforcement agency
receiving information under subsection (i)(7)(A), any local child support
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information” includes taxpayer names as well as other information.169 It is likely that
the United States violated the general rule of section 6103 because the United States
improperly disclosed taxpayer names in the KPMG case. In addition, it is not likely
that the United States can rely on any of the exceptions to section 6103, as neither
DOJ nor the IRS:
(1) alleged in the summons enforcement action that the named taxpayers
owe additional taxes, interest or penalties, nor did the summons
enforcement action arise out of, or in connection with, determining the
named taxpayer's civil or criminal liability, or the collection of the named
taxpayer’s civil tax liability;170
(2) were seeking via the summons enforcement action to resolve the
treatment on the return of KPMG;171 or
(3) disclosed the return information pursuant to a transactional
relationship between the named taxpayer and KPMG which affects, or
may affect, the resolution of an issue in the summons enforcement
action.172
Section 7431 provides redress for taxpayers in which such confidential taxpayer
information is improperly disclosed.173 Although the IRS disclosure of confidential
taxpayer names appears to meet the general rule giving rise to a cause of action,174 it
is unlikely that the named taxpayers would recover damages because the United
States is likely to meet the exception where the disclosing party has a good faith, but
erroneous, interpretation of section 6103.175 The United States would meet this
enforcement agency, or any local agency administering a program listed in
subsection (l)(7)(D) who has or had access to returns or return information
under this section , and
(3) No other person (or officer or employee thereof) who has or had access to
returns or return information under subsection (e)(1)(D)(iii), paragraph (6),
(12), or (16) of subjection (l), paragraph (2) or (4)(B) of subsection (m), or
subsection (n), shall disclose any return or return information obtained by him
in any manner in connection with his services as such an officer or an
employee or otherwise or under the provisions of this section. For purposes of
this subsection, the term “officer or employee” includes a former officer or
employee.
Id.
169

26 U.S.C. § 6103(b)(2)(A) provides in pertinent part that “return information” means “a
taxpayer’s identity, the nature, source, or amount of his income, payments, receipts,
deductions, exemptions, credits, assets, liabilities, net worth, tax liability, tax withheld,
deficiencies, over assessments, or tax payments. …” Id. (emphasis added.)
170

26 U.S.C. § 6103(h)(2)(A)-(h)(4)(A).

171

26 U.S.C. § 6103(h)(2)(B)-(h)(4)(B).

172

26 U.S.C. § 6103(h)(2)(C)-(h)(4)(C).

173

I.R.C. § 7431.

174

I.R.C. § 7431(a)(1).

175

I.R.C. § 7431(b)(1).
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exception by showing that a reasonable IRS agent would have believed that the agent
could disclose the information. For purposes of this Article, it is assumed that the
IRS would be able to meet this threshold by showing that KPMG was the taxpayer in
the summons enforcement action and that its internal policies dictated that it may
disclose third party names when filing a petition to enforce KPMG’s summonses.
Assuming Tax Analysts is successful in its FOIA requests of the government, the
decision making process of the government on this matter will illuminate whether
this assumption is borne out by the facts.
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